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Antoine Strobel‐​Dahan – Last week, Alternative für Deutschland, Germany’s far-right political party, won the local election in Saxony-Anhalt ^[1]. We’ve heard a lot here in France that, “for the first time since World War II,” a far-right government may come to power in a German federal state.
Even though this result had been anticipated by the polls, what was your reaction when you learned that the AfD had received almost 44% of the vote?

Ofer Waldman – Well, I don’t want to use the word “shock,” because shock implies surprise, and this is not a surprise. We’ve seen it coming. But of course, it marks a moment in history.

And for me, the first thing I thought—because, again, I also work in the Israeli context—is that this is further proof that we are part of a generation, in Germany, in Europe, but also in the Middle East and North America, that is moving away from the historical lessons of the Shoah and the Second World War.

Those lessons commit us to upholding humanitarian law and international law. They commit us to moderation in our politics, rather than seeking out the extremes.

And the fact that 44% of German citizens in Saxony-Anhalt—and, as we know, 29% nationwide according to the latest polls, which would make the AfD the largest political force in the country—are willing to vote for the AfD basically means that they are willing to move away from the lessons of German history, which are also the lessons of German‐​Jewish history.

But again, I don’t think this is simply a German problem. Of course, it has a particularly bitter resonance when it happens in Germany. There is also a bitter resonance when it happens in Israel, when you see Israeli politicians expressing themselves in ways that are profoundly undemocratic and profoundly opposed to the principles of humanitarian law and international law.

For me personally, this gives me even more motivation to ask : how can we take the historical lessons of 1945 and make them accessible to people living today, more than 80 years after Auschwitz was liberated and the Second World War ended ?

ASD – There was an idea—perhaps even an illusion—that Germany was somehow immune to the far right. Because of its history, Germany has probably done more than any other country to understand the processes that lead to far-right politics, to fight them and to prevent far-right parties from gaining power.
And yet, for years now, we have seen the AfD growing, culminating in this first major electoral victory. What went wrong?

OW – I don’t want to sound apologetic. I would say that what we are seeing in Germany happened in other European countries 10 or 20 years ago.

The German Erinnerungskultur—the memory culture you referred to, this national effort to commemorate and remember the lessons of the Second World War and, politically, especially the lessons of right‐​wing extremism—has protected Germany to an extent. What we are seeing today happened in other European states earlier, and now we are seeing it in Germany. This culture protected democracy for 10 or 20 years longer than in other places. But as we can see, it did not make Germany immune to political extremism.

So yes, of course, I think German civil society, German politics, the German cultural sphere and German academia have to ask themselves some serious questions. I mean, the elections in Saxony-Anhalt—and, as you said, I think Mecklenburg‐​Vorpommern is going to be the same, Saxony is going to be the same, and who knows what will happen in the next general elections ?

I think it is a mirror for German academia, politics and culture, and for different federal institutions and agencies. It is their job to prevent exactly this kind of thing from happening, and they have failed.

So the question is indeed : what went wrong ? How did we fail to make a younger generation of Germans understand why the first sentence of the German Constitution says that human dignity is inviolable ? We have obviously failed.

But I have to add that there is, of course, an East German context that cannot be neglected. The reason the AfD is especially strong in the East has historical roots. Angela Merkel said during her final year in office that she too had failed to create a common German narrative, a unified German narrative.

There are many people, especially in East Germany, who will do almost anything to protest against the central government in Berlin. They won’t get vaccinated against Covid ; they will vote for the AfD ; they will do everything they can to demonstrate their opposition to Berlin.

I don’t think that 44% of the population of Saxony‐​Anhalt are neo‐​Nazis. I think a substantial proportion of those 44% are protest voters voting against the central government in Berlin, rather than German nationalists or German neo‐Nazis.

ASD – I’ve come across this German word, which seems quite difficult to translate into English: Vergangenheitsbewältigung. I understand it as the effort to confront, acknowledge and take responsibility for the crimes of the past.

It seems that some members of younger generations are saying: “Let this story become history. It’s not ours anymore.”

Of course, that doesn’t mean that people who vote for the AfD are neo-Nazis or anything like that. But perhaps it means that they no longer want to carry this responsibility in the way their parents or grandparents did, or chose to do. Is there a generational gap?

OW: You are making a very important distinction between memory and history. It was the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs who argued that there is such a thing as a living collective memory, and that it usually lasts around 75 years. After 75 years—which means three generations—memory becomes history. You also find this distinction between memory and history in the work of the French historian Pierre Nora and the German historian Jan Assmann.

I am 47 years old. You and I grew up in a world in which the Holocaust and the Second World War were still the immediate historical reference for everything, including culture. There is this beautiful book by the French author Annie Ernaux, The Years, in which the Second World War remains the living historical reference. That is now over, after 75 years.

The German historian Norbert Frei said in 2005 : that’s it, we have crossed the threshold between living memory and history.

So that is one answer. For the current generation, the Second World War, the Holocaust and Auschwitz are like Verdun is for you and me : history.

And the second thing is the German expression you mentioned, Vergangenheitsbewältigung. There was actually an evolution in the expressions that were used.

The first generation—the perpetrators, those who had served in the German army and the SS, those who had been members of the Nazi Party, the NSDAP—used the word Schlussstrich : we want to draw a line under history and start again, tabula rasa, after 1945.

Their children spoke about Vergangenheitsbewältigung, overcoming the past : acknowledging the past, but also overcoming it.

Their children spoke about Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung, processing or working through the past. That was the 1990s, when Germany really dealt with its past in a very admirable manner.

And their children, who are among today’s AfD voters, are returning to this idea of a Schlussstrich. They are saying : enough is enough. We’re back to drawing a line under history.

1945 is die Stunde Null, zero hour, something like ground zero, and we start again.

It is like when one of the AfD leaders in the Bundestag said that the 12 years of the Third Reich were a Vogelschiss in German history—a piece of bird droppings in German history.

That is what they mean : those years are now meaningless for today’s political reality.

And if they are meaningless for today’s political reality, then there is no reason why Germans should vote any differently from people who vote for Marine Le Pen, Heinz‐​Christian Strache in Austria, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Nigel Farage in the UK, or Itamar Ben Gvir in Israel.

There is no difference, because the lesson of rejecting political extremism and supporting international law and human rights is no longer considered valid.

ASD – I was quite surprised when I heard Chancellor Friedrich Merz at a press conference the day after the election. He seemed stunned, even shocked. You said you don’t want to use the word “shock” because it implies surprise, but he somehow did seem surprised, almost as if he couldn’t believe it. I was wondering whether there had been a kind of disbelief or complacency before the election within the German political class. And afterwards, he used some very strong words that were presumably intended to reassure people, but which I personally didn’t find reassuring at all: “The institutions are strong. Don’t worry.” It almost sounded as though the strength of the institutions had suddenly become a question. If nobody asked the question and you suddenly feel the need to tell us that the institutions are strong, perhaps that means you are worried they may not be. On Thursday, apparently, the federal government is considering withholding certain documents from the AfD if it enters an alliance to govern—for instance, crisis plans—because of concerns that they could be passed on to Russia.

OW - I would be very cautious about commenting on Chancellor Merz’s remarks.

I would say that he should not be that surprised, because even before the previous elections in Germany we had seen that he was willing, to some extent, to accept cooperation with the AfD at federal level.

After the previous government of the SPD, the Liberals and the Greens collapsed, or lost its vote of confidence in the Bundestag, Friedrich Merz passed—not a resolution, but a declaration—through the German Bundestag on migration and other issues with the votes of the AfD.

So Friedrich Merz should not be that surprised. After playing with fire, he should not be surprised to get slightly burned.

We know that there are parts of the CDU that openly think about tearing down the so‐​called firewall—the CDU’s policy of refusing to cooperate with the AfD.

We also know that the German domestic intelligence service, the Bundesverfassungsschutz, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, has declared the AfD to be a right‐​wing extremist party that rejects Germany’s democratic constitutional order. But this declaration still has to go through legal proceedings, and that has not happened yet.

On the other hand, there are voices on the left calling for the AfD to be banned.

Because it is not simply a question of whether the AfD would disclose documents to Russia. If the AfD gains power in Saxony‐​Anhalt, that means the state intelligence service of Saxony‐​Anhalt is in the hands of the AfD. It means that the universities of Saxony‐​Anhalt are in the hands of the AfD. It means the radio, the agency for civic education, the theatres, the orchestras and the schools are in the hands of the AfD.

It means that the AfD will receive democratic tools that could help it destroy German democracy from within.

It recalls the 1930s, when the NSDAP—and I am not saying that the AfD is the same as the NSDAP—was an anti‐​democratic party that used the tools of democracy to destroy the Weimar Republic from within.

And the fact that German democracy has not developed a strategy to cope with this threat is a failure—not only a failure of Friedrich Merz, by the way, but of previous administrations as well. But it is particularly his responsibility now that he is Chancellor.

ASD – That is quite frightening, because if you decide not to give them the power they have earned through elections, then you are already harming democracy in another way. But if you let them exercise that power, you may be allowing democracy itself to be harmed. Are you saying it is too late?

OW: I have been a political person my entire life, for as long as I can remember. Even when I was a musician, I came to Germany as part of the West‐​Eastern Divan Orchestra, founded by Daniel Barenboim and Edward Said, the Israeli‐​Arab orchestra.

And I think that as long as you have the freedom, the liberty and the privilege to ask me this question, and I have the freedom, the liberty and the privilege to think about my answer and give it to you, that means that you and I have not only the privilege, liberty and freedom to have this conversation—we also have an obligation.

We have an obligation to defend democracy with every means we have, using all the privileges we have.

I hear people in Germany—not only in Saxony‐​Anhalt but elsewhere as well—say : “Now we have to leave. Let’s go to Canada, let’s go to New Zealand, let’s go to Chile, let’s go to the moon,” whatever.

It is like people in Israel. I hear people saying : “If Netanyahu wins the coming elections at the end of October, if Ben‐​Gvir is still Minister of Internal Security, we will leave Israel.”

And then you ask them : okay, you have the privilege to leave Germany. You have the privilege to leave Israel. You have the financial means, the education, the networks. You can start a new life somewhere else.

But what about the people who can’t ?

What about the migrants living in Saxony‐​Anhalt today ? If the AfD gains power there and takes control of the police, what will their lives look like while you are starting your new life in Montreal, Oakland or somewhere else ?

What does that mean for your commitment—for the obligation that results from your privilege, your education, and the liberties and freedoms we still have ?

Because, again, you can ask me this question and I can give you this answer. That means it is not lost. It means that we have to stand up and fight with everything we have, in solidarity with our democratic friends in Israel, Germany, France, the United States—everywhere. Because everywhere we face the same challenges. The manifestations are different, the contexts are different, but the challenge is the same.

And by the way, our enemies are very well interconnected. The enemies of democracy are globally interconnected, so we have to be interconnected as well. We cannot give up. And we have to stand our ground.

ASD – In order to govern in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD may need to form some kind of alliance with the small left-wing populist party BSW, which was created after a split from Die Linke. We saw a somewhat similar alliance between right-wing and left-wing populists in Italy in 2018, with the coalition between the Five Star Movement and the Lega. But it remains quite unusual. What would this possibility mean to you—the two political extremes coming together in order to govern, or perhaps to challenge democratic institutions? What does the possibility of such an alliance add to your view of the situation?

OW – The voters of the AfD and BSW are very similar. Again, referring to what I said before, some of them—not all of them—are protest voters.

Sahra Wagenknecht, the founder of BSW, the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, is in many ways a manifestation of protest against everything, all the time.

Everybody is pro‐​Ukrainian, so she shows more understanding towards Russia. The AfD does too, by the way. She enjoys being anti‐​consensus and anti‐establishment.

We know from many places, including Italy and elsewhere, the so‐​called horseshoe theory : the idea that the extremes of the political spectrum, the far right and the far left, bend towards one another like the ends of a horseshoe.

Without commenting directly on the AfD or BSW, I would say there is something very disturbing about what I hear from both parties.

They are not actually talking about forming a coalition, by the way. They are talking about collaborating on specific political issues without formally forming a coalition. Each time the parliament of Saxony‐​Anhalt considers a new project, they would examine that particular proposal and potentially work together on it. So these would be ad hoc collaborations.

ASD – You are Israeli and you now live in Israel, but you spent several years in Germany. The shift towards the far right is a global trend. We see it in Italy, the United States and Argentina, but also in India, Colombia and Thailand—it is not only a Western phenomenon—as well as Chile, Japan and, of course, Israel. It is not only Germany. It is everywhere. As a Jewish Israeli who knows German society in depth, how do you see this dangerous path that we seem to be on globally?

OW – I will answer you in an unexpected way. Ever since my first day as head of the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Israel, I have said that the challenges we see here for Israeli democracy are not specifically Israeli challenges. They are global challenges manifesting themselves in an Israeli context.

When I hear criticism of Israeli society—and there is a great deal to criticize about Israel : because of Gaza, because of the ongoing violence in the West Bank, because of policies that undermine the prospects of lasting peace in the Middle East, including with Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, but first and foremost because of the racist, cruel and violent treatment of Palestinians, the occupation, the annexation… There is a great deal to criticize about Israel.

But when people say that Israelis are somehow a special kind of people who have a particular problem with democracy, or a particular problem with human rights, I think that begins to sound slightly antisemitic.

Because the challenges we face in Israel are not uniquely Israeli challenges. Their manifestation in Israel is particularly bloody because we are in the middle of the Middle Eastern conflict.

And especially after October 7—and I am not saying October 7 was the starting point ; October 7 is another point in history, but a very bloody one—it unleashed the demons of this region, on the Jewish‐​Israeli side, on the Palestinian side, in Lebanon, Iran and beyond. But this is not merely an Israeli challenge.

And that gives me hope, because I know that my allies in fighting for the future of the people of this land—for Palestinians and Jews—are not only here. Jews and Palestinians will only have a peaceful and prosperous future when there is a sovereign state of Israel and, alongside it, a sovereign state of Palestine. And the people fighting for that future have allies in Germany, France, the United States, the UK and everywhere else, because everywhere we face the same challenge.

Israeli civil society organizations bravely fighting for the democratic future of this place have a great deal of experience to offer. I think our allies in Germany, who are now beginning to understand the monster that has grown in their own backyard, can learn a lot from organizations such as B’Tselem, Breaking the Silence, the New Israel Fund, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and all the other organizations of Israeli civil society. This solidarity and reciprocal learning between the different arenas of this global fight for democracy is something that gives me hope.

Here in Israel, the left is very small. It is unfortunate, but it is true. There is no majority within Israel for the two‐​state solution or for a democratic future for this place. But globally, I don’t think we are such a small group. And that gives me hope.

ASD - I have one last question—the one everyone is thinking about but may hesitate to ask. It may be a little too caricatural, but to what extent is the AfD an heir to the ideas of the NSDAP? And how would you describe its relationship with antisemitism today?

OW - Historical comparisons are very useful and important tools for understanding. We make historical comparisons between countries and between different historical episodes because they help us understand processes.

In some respects, for instance, we can look at Russia today and what happened to Russian civil society. We can look at what happened in Hungary and Poland. This helps us understand and learn about the dos and don’ts in different places.

I know that many American activists in democratic civil society learn a great deal from their European allies and colleagues. So historical comparisons are incredibly important.

But they only go so far, because you also have to take the present context into account : social media, globalization, modernity or postmodernity. There is a difference between 100 years ago and today.

But if you read the writings of the German‐​Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt, nationalism has always been very effective as a way to mobilize masses of people who feel neglected by society, by the establishment and by the elites.

In that sense, nothing has changed from the 19th century to the 20th century and now the 21st century, even if the tools are different.

The question of antisemitism is an interesting one because the far right in Germany today has a particular position. I do not accept or adopt their perspective, but this is what they say.

They target migrational communities, especially Muslim migrants. And the leadership of the AfD essentially says : the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

And they perceive the current Israel government as also in conflict with the Arab, the Muslim world. . So we see far‐​right movements in Europe considering Israel an ally in a global struggle against what they perceive as their enemy : the Arab world and the Muslim world.

Every time I hear German politicians praising the “Judeo‐​Christian tradition,” I think : you know, that tradition was not always so rosy. And the most important question about that expression is : whom does it exclude ? It excludes Muslims.

If it is the Judeo‐​Christian tradition, then by definition it is not Muslim. So Muslims—whether German citizens or not—are implicitly being told that they are not part of the tradition, not part of this consensus and, therefore, should not really be part of Germany.

And you see, especially among AfD officials, that they understand this and instrumentalize it. Let me give you an example. In 2015 and 2016, when large numbers of Syrian refugees entered Germany, the AfD was not yet represented in the Bundestag. But all of a sudden, you started hearing very conservative voices in German politics, from the CDU and particularly from the CSU, the governing party in Bavaria, saying : “We have to defend our Jewish communities. We have to close the borders.”

Now, these are people who, frankly, didn’t show much interest up until then for Jewish life. But suddenly they discovered this deep concern for the Jewish people because they could say : “Now we have a common enemy.”

That said, when you go down to the rank and file of the AfD, when you talk to ordinary AfD voters, you will find the good old antisemitism that has never ceased to exist, either in West Germany or in East Germany.

And sometimes we have Israeli officials and Jewish officials saying that the greatest danger to Jewish life in Germany comes from the left and from migrants, even though the statistics from the German federal police are very clear : the majority of violent acts against Jews and Israelis in Germany come from the far right, not from migrants and not from left‐​wing extremists. And still they say : “No, no, the greatest danger comes from Arabs and Muslims.”

That is a cynical misuse, for political purposes, of the very important fight against antisemitism. And it contributes, among other things, to the rise of the AfD, which is unacceptable from a Jewish perspective.

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[1] In Germany, the Länder have broad political and administrative autonomy, particularly in areas such as policing, education, culture and public administration. A state government therefore controls many institutions that, in more centralized countries such as France, fall under the authority of the central government.